An excerpt from Stand & Deliver: A Design For Successful Government (2014) Ed Straw
Rarely are the benefits of competition talked of in relation to democracy. Yes for companies but not governments. Competition matters just as much here. Not just for political parties, but for policies, decisions, solutions, and for people in government jobs – including leaders. This is not just about competition raising standards and learning, it’s also about what it stops – zigzag government, preferential lobbying, ‘secret policymaking’ disasters.
Politics and government in democracies is a competitive market. This can be a major stimulant to improvement. In Britain and the US proper competition is stymied by First Past The Post electoral systems producing duopolies in the parties of government, and the ‘dismal choice’. Monopoly Civil Services prevent or limit competition in policymaking and in delivery and, as we have seen, government is typically cut off from the beneficial effect of these forces by smoke and mirrors. One of the challenges for a modern system of government is to harness the power of competition at the political party level. Our current system limits competition as much as it can without becoming an elective dictatorship. Our design needs to go in the opposite direction.
A developing society in a complex world depends as much for its future on solution diversity and experimentation as does the natural world on biodiversity. A similar truth applies also to lifestyles. I used to wonder why I felt so strongly about the Daily Mail, then realised that it has had such a narrow idea of acceptable lifestyles that it has been the nearest the UK has had to a fascist party since Oswald Mosley’s (fascism seeks uniformity – and hence why it always fails). We need diversity of lifestyles and power precisely because we cannot know which will turn out to work best in the future, or indeed even survive. Diverse societies are resilient societies.
Diversity is key throughout systems of government. The greater the diversity the more likely to find an answer to some really complex problems. Thus far we have incorporated into our system diversity and competition through real local government, and in policies through engagement, using other countries experiences, and experimentation. Now we come to the political parties and their leaders.
Here, the Treaty has five clauses, all essential to functioning competitive democracy: full political party competition through full proportional voting; effective means to change the party leader/prime minister, and backbench governance; equality in party funding; maximum four-year terms for governments; and the right to referendum. All of these changes apply to the UK (some countries already have proper PR and fair funding of political parties).
Proportional Voting
Every country needs proportional representation at every level of government. This would not be the rather fey interpretation called the additional vote, but straight PR based on the transferable vote, requiring a minimum percentage (typically 5%) to be represented in Parliament. Various systems of proportional voting exist around the world: pick the best in conjunction with the wider system of government proposed here.
PR buys you higher standards of political parties and of politicians and ministers; an end to zigzag government and its costs; pruned ideologies; fresh thinking; wider and better representation of interests and objectives (for example the response to climate chaos); and insulation from powerful lobbies. It also provides some significant inoculation against news-media hobbling and its hold over governments through the plurality of parties and the norm of coalitions. The more parties you have to buy, the harder it is. Two-party states are far easier to x than multi-party. Murdoch has always opposed PR.
Usually at this point, a politician (trying hard to mask his patronising tone) will stress how important is strong and decisive government and thus first past the post. At this point too we should think about just who are these people attracted to these top positions of great power, and their motivations. Are these the people of our dreams of balanced mind and sound judgement, possessed of clear vision, committed to our good as citizens, able to operationalise their objectives swiftly and without the unexpected? Or something else?
Once a politician explains a decision by the need for strong government, you can be certain this is someone at the top end of power needs. As expected, we heard this in relation to the Alternative Vote referendum by those opposed to power sharing – ‘we need the strong government that only first past the post can give’ and, by inference, not the namby-pamby wimp-type government from coalitions and other inadequates. Sounds good, does it not? Flutters the spine? Makes one stand up straight?
From time to time, we have experienced strong government, most potently with Thatcher. She drove some changes through which we would all agree with, in hindsight, like building the M25. She drove some necessary change but punitively and with destructive speed, like the mine closures. She also drove hard some major errors, like the poll tax.
I never saw the point of strong government, when strong can and does lead to such high costs. I want right government, not strong government. Right government may from time to time be bold and courageous, and it may also be considered, cautious, careful, and experimental. Strong is just an excuse for the more psychologically flawed. Its end game is Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Hitler. And a Thatcher would never have been necessary to resolve the worst excesses of the UK’s ideological hangover in the factories if we had had the plurality of proportional voting. First past the post produced both the problem and the strong and costly solution. It maintains a country in a permanent state of civilian civil war. No first past the post – no problem – no need for Thatcher. What joy.
Changing a Prime Minister and Backbench Governance
How a political party changes its leader might be thought of as solely for the party to decide. But political parties are part of the system of government and sometimes those leaders are prime ministers. Thus changing the leader is part of the Treaty.
Let us contrast two systems for this – that of the Labour Party and that of the Conservatives. These are the rules for a challenge to the leader of the Conservatives. A leadership election is triggered either by the resignation of the party leader, or following a vote of ‘no confidence’ by Conservative MPs. To secure a confidence vote, 15% of Conservative MPs must submit a request for such a vote, in writing, to the chairman of the 1922 Committee. This can be done either collectively or separately. The names of the signatories would not be disclosed. The chairman, in consultation with the leader, then determines the date of such a vote ‘as soon as possible in the circumstances prevailing’. If the incumbent leader wins the support of a simple majority in any such vote, they would remain leader and no further vote could be called for a period of twelve months from the date of the ballot. If the leader were to lose such a vote (again, on a simple majority basis) they must resign, and they may not stand in the leadership election that is then triggered.
Labour changes its leaders like FIFA selects World Cup venues. The rules for a challenge to the leader of the Labour Party when also prime minister are these: ‘When the PLP is in government and the leader and/or deputy leader are prime minister and/or in Cabinet, an election shall proceed only if requested by a majority of party conference on a card vote of the individual members, MPs, and trade union members.’ Thus a party conference has to be called first, then a vote held in public. The political consequences of such a divisive and ‘dirty washing in public’ event are such that in practice the chances of a party conference voting to call a leadership election with a sitting Labour prime minister are zero. In other words, when in government, the Labour prime minister cannot be challenged. He or she is there until resignation or election loss. Ousting a Labour prime minister becomes a tortuously long process that debilitates government and saps public confidence, as seen both with Blair and Brown. Personal power politicking takes over.
The Partnership in Power report applied from 1997 took the power at conference to set policy and elect NEC members away from individual party members and from the trade unions. A sense of order and calm was established – essential to electability. However, this power went to the leadership, and not to the party’s MPs. Thus the leader – and in government the prime minister – became less accountable.
Before 1965, leaders of the Conservative Party were not elected, but ‘emerged’ after discussion among Conservative MPs, a system that is described by one academic as ‘an opaque process of negotiation and soundings involving senior party gures’. The leadership race that took place at the 1963 Conservative Party Conference following Macmillan’s resignation through ill health proved most controversial, and prompted Ian Macleod’s reference in an article for the Spectator in 1964 to the ‘magic circle’ within the party.
When asked about the 2010 Labour leader election, one former Cabinet minister said, ‘We have decided David [Miliband] will be the next leader.’ Labour now had its own magic circle and opaque process worthy of the Tories before 1965. But this Cabinet minister had forgotten that the election of a new leader did involve an open process, albeit with flaws. Ironically, Ed Miliband benefited from a desire amongst some to end the dominance of the New Labour establishment, voting him in rather than David.
From an organisational perspective, recruitment, as appointing a leader is called, is never an exact process. No matter how careful the job and candidate specification, the incisiveness of the interviews, the precision of the psychometric tests, the revelations of the assessment centres, or whatever means is used to select, only when the job is being done will you know whether that recruit will succeed or not. The sin in recruitment is not in making a mistake in selection but in not acknowledging and acting on a mistake once made. This should be an organisational hanging offence. Of course, too many appointers see their political stock falling if a mistake has to be acknowledged. But the alternative is labouring on under a failing leader with a failing organisation. Good governance needs to be there to force the organisation to confront and resolve dif cult issues.
The Conservative Party is able to change its leader when it needs to because the 1922 Committee is a forum where the performance and electability of the prime minister/leader can be discussed without looking over one’s shoulder too much. The committee comprises all Conservative private Members. When in government, that means the entire backbench membership (i.e. all bar ministers) of the party. In Opposition, it comprises all Conservative Members bar the leader. It is chaired by a senior backbencher, who enjoys access to the party leader and keeps the leadership informed of backbench opinion. Other office-holders are elected annually to form, with the chairman, an Executive Committee. The committee acts as a ‘sounding board’ of opinion among Conservative Members. The press often refers to the committee as ‘the influential 1922 Committee’, and indeed it is influential, although not so much in terms of policy. Philip (now Lord) Norton alluded to the popular presumption that a visit from a delegation of the 1922 – dubbed the ‘men in grey suits’ – constitutes the traditional means of removing a leader, but he went on to state: ‘In practice, no leader had ever gone as a result of any such visit; nonetheless, this mythology has helped underpin the influence of the 1922 Committee.’
As a footnote, when David Cameron became prime minister in 2010, he sought to widen the membership of the 1922 Committee to ministers. In other words, those being governed would now be part of the governing. None of us particularly welcome others checking up on what we are doing. Cameron’s proposal was understandable as a human being. The prime minister did not want this particular check and balance hanging over him – it would diminish his personal power – and he could neuter it by being at the meetings, implicitly threatening any criticism by his presence and his power of patronage as prime minister. Anyone who has ever sat on a board, be it of the largest company or of a small charity, will know that the conversation is very different with the management present and with them not. Even without the corporate politics to contend with, people are much more open, direct, and honest in their criticisms without their subjects present. To the credit of the party, this proposal was rejected. The institutional memory was sufficient to know why the 1922 Committee comprised backbenchers only, and how important it was to the party’s success.
Under the Treaty, every party would have a committee of backbenchers, and simple rules to trigger a confidence vote on 15% of MPs requesting it without their names being disclosed. Whilst in government, electing the new leader/prime minister has to be a task for its MPs only, for two reasons: first, the practical politics of taking such a vote to a party conference with the delays involved render it impossible; second, MPs have been elected by the public (conference members have not) and thus in terms of representation have the remit to make this change.
Funding of Political Parties
State funding for political parties is well established in some countries. Broadly the funding received is based on share of the vote above a certain minimum with a small maximum on any individual or private donations. This is not an immediately popular proposal with many of the public who would of course be footing the bill, not least because of the underperformance of our political parties. But, as we have found, this is the consequence of our inadequate constitutions. Stronger constitutions will produce far better performance, but part of that strengthening is state funding. This is therefore an investment by the taxpayers. Look what it buys you: levelling of the playing field and fair competition between parties unbiased by the money they can raise; supporting parties other than the two major ones and thus strengthening their competition, promoting new entrants, and raising the standards of government; insulation from big business buying decisions for itself and against you; insulation from the preferences of the very rich and their odd requirements of government policy; consequently policies that benefit the public; and an end to cash for honours and to the appointment of people to positions in return for donations.
State funding would be relatively small. In today’s world of the Internet, significant sums can be raised through small donations. It is part of competitive democracy for parties to make their case to electors and in so doing to attract donations. Clearly a cap must be placed on these otherwise, as now, large donors can buy influence and distort decisions. This cap would certainly be no more than £50,000.
Four-Year Terms for Governments
All democracies specify terms of office for any government. Typically these are four years. In the UK it is now a fixed five. But under the old ‘maximum of five’ rule, if a government was doing well then invariably it went for election after four. Only failing governments stay on for five. So that’s clear then. The Treaty specifies four. You could argue persuasively for three.
Right to Referendum
From time to time, in competition with the government of the day, we the people will want to take a decision by referendum. The Treaty therefore has to incorporate a means for one to be called by means other than a vote in Parliament. To bring the Treaty into effect will take just such a referendum, but at present we would have to wait until a government decided to allow us this vote. This is clearly absurd. And uncompetitive.
The Treaty therefore includes a provision for a number of signatures proportional to the number of electors to call a referendum on a specific subject. This proportion will be set by looking around the world at practice and adopting that which works best. Fairly obviously the proportion should not be so low that votes are being held excessively, nor so high to make any vote impossible.
Referenda serve other purposes too. One of Churchill’s’ famous quotes is: ‘The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.’ To produce successful government, democracy must be infused with intelligence. The Treaty already contains a number of ways of doing this, from Engagement to Feedback. All of these will help us to learn. A referendum is a further powerful tool, in that we get to live with the consequences of our choice – good and bad. The Swiss system for regular referendum on matters small and large, local and national, is designed to bring together and reassure the many peoples forming the federation, but it also means people take much more responsibility for decisions and are party to (sometimes culpable for) wrong decisions.
Having the power, as in Switzerland, to refer back any piece of national or local legislation or decision through collecting signatures and holding a vote is a further expansion of competition and democracy. At present, I think we may have enough to do to get the Treaty to work, and I therefore see this as a later change.
Tamper-Proof Democracy
For this whole new system to work well, and to promote competitive democracy, the rules must be tamper-proof. That means some body on the end of them to patrol and enforce when necessary. As mentioned already, under the Treaty this would be the reformed
House of Lords. If you are in a country with a politicised second chamber then this role would have to be carried out by others, most likely a constitutional court. My experience of our judicial system is that it can be really right, but it is also unaware of what it does not know or has not experienced. So, it has not experienced organisation and consequently has made a hash of employment law. It does not know families and all their complexity and so has made a mess of family law. Organisation is the foundation of the Treaty and I would not want the judges getting involved through a constitutional court. The House of Lords may occasionally need the back-up of the courts, but essentially it would be the custodian of the Treaty, the keeper of the keys.
Two other roles are required of the Lords in this section on competitive democracy: standards of behaviour, and regulating news-media relationships.
Behaviour and Standards Applicable to Ministers and Others
We are talking here of the behaviour of ministers and all in government and in the wider system. This is another area where the Westminster model is flawed. The way in which ministerial behaviour is regulated in practice amounts to exposure by the news media or flagging by senior civil servants. It is then up to the prime minister as to whether to bow to such pressure and to force an immediate ‘resignation’, or to refer it to formal independent investigation.
The civil servants who flag incorrect actions are, of course, the very same civil servants who, under the current convention, are accountable to the same minister for all that they do, deliver, policy-ise, etc. Thus either the accountability loses out (it does) or the flagging droops in the wind (it can).
With the present ‘the only sin is to be found out’ arrangements, the news media has stepped in. Typically the celebratory pugilist interviewers of the BBC perform the essential constitutional role of regulating ministerial standards through investigation, exposure, and challenge. They should not have to (other than in exceptional circumstances) and it does come with significant downside.
Journalists behave like the judiciary in seeking out the guilty, they decide what constitutes sacking behaviour, and act as judge and jury. Quality ministers get killed in the rush to judgement, as well as the more deserving. It serves the psychopathologies of the journalists and acts as some constraint on the psychopathologies of ministers, but is at the end of the day a flaw for a flaw. In reallocating power, the Treaty would subject governments and their decisions to far greater scrutiny. Thus inappropriate behaviour would reduce. However, Parliament needs rigorous means to regulate behaviour.
Under the Treaty this would be a role for the House of Lords, with straightforward referral, fast and incisive investigation, and appropriate disposal. The news media could then spend its time in contributing intelligence to the many complex issues we face without sniffing a scalp at the end of every interchange.
The public sector statutory duties apply equally to ministers. But there are other standards applicable in terms of conflict of interest – for example a lawyer in government making policy affecting lawyers in practice – and whether a decision is being influenced by a personal connection or incentive. Under the Treaty the opportunities for politicians to bend a decision are far fewer, of course. This is not primarily a moral stance (although it is that as well), but any corruption is inefficient and makes for poor government, (which will come out in the Resulture).
News-Media Relationship Rules
Again the Treaty provides for a vastly better balance of influence on the decisions of government. But news media will continue to wield power and this should not be permitted to lead to unstated deals. Is there ever any good reason for a prime minister to meet the head of a media corporation? The editors and journalists, yes but never the top managers.
Any meeting with the senior people in news-media companies would be reported. The de facto open diaries of today are an intrusion on a politician’s privacy and an inevitable response to secret deals. The price of being in politics is some transparency. That should include who you are spending time with (as distinct from in bed with) who has influence and/or interests in government. Competition rulings – the main area of interest for deals – are not matters of politics and should be for apolitical competition authorities where ministers are not found. In any event these rulings should exclude any politician who has had contact with media executives, other than in relation to the reference and on the record.
Finally, here, two publically listed media companies with heavy news interests have constructed their shareholdings to maintain personal power. Thus while both News Corp and the Daily Mail and General Trust have voting and non-voting shares, most of the voting shares are held by the Murdochs and the Rothermeres and their man Paul Dacre. This is simply poor corporate governance. Any company with poor governance would be prohibited from all contact with ministers. (Although not the subject of this book, newspaper regulation – which has proved to be impossible on a self-regulating basis but which is feared if government-regulated – could be better placed in the largely non-political House of Lords.)
Our new system now has in place effective feedback, the Resulture, policy vetting, new separations of powers, delivery with zero defects, t people to work in it, and competitive democracy. One last building block remains to be designed: the foundation of fairness.
